Explosive NSICOP Report Exposes Depth Of Indian Foreign Interference In Canada

India was identified as a “primary perpetrator” of transnational repression against diasporic communities in Canada, and its activities have been identified as a “significant concern.”

Jaskaran Sandhu
June 5, 2024 | 7 min. read | Original Reporting

The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP)’s “Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada's Democratic Processes and Institutions”, which makes its findings based upon confidential intelligence and analysis, has Sikh groups demanding immediate action from Canadian decision makers. 

“Once again, India has come to the forefront as a key foreign interference threat to Canada,” World Sikh Organization of Canada President, Danish Singh, stated in a press release on the report’s findings. 

The heavily redacted report was publicly released on Monday. 

The NSICOP report reiterates earlier findings that India is the second-most significant foreign interference threat to Canada after China.  India was identified as a “primary perpetrator” of transnational repression against diasporic communities in Canada, and its activities have been identified as a “significant concern.”

The report specifically states that “India emerged as the second-most significant foreign interference threat to Canada’s democratic institutions and processes...it became clear during the period of this review that its efforts had extended beyond countering what it perceived as pro-Khalistani efforts in Canada to include interfering in Canadian democratic processes and institutions, including through the targeting of Canadian politicians, ethnic media and Indo-Canadian ethnocultural communities.”

One of the more shocking allegations and findings from the report is that some Canadian Members of Parliament were used by India to conduct foreign interference, including influencing colleagues and receiving payments from India and its proxies to raise issues in Parliament. 

“The Canadian public deserves to know which of their representatives are compromising our democracy by engaging with foreign governments. These actions not only breach the trust of Canadian citizens but also endanger national security,” Danish Singh shares, adding that the names of those involved must be disclosed.  

At this time, the government has not fully committed to publicly releasing the names of the alleged MPs referred to in the report, which has attracted scrutiny and criticism from politicians and advocacy groups. Canada’s Deputy Prime Minister, Chrystia Freeland, has only “vowed” to conduct a review into the possible collusion of MPs with foreign actors.  

Canadian commentators have also shared concerns around the lack of urgency from Canadian politicians in raising alarm over the report’s findings, including evidence that India allegedly interfered in the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) leadership race. 

Contrary to CPC claims made to the CBC on June 4, 2024, that this was “first time we have heard about it,” a Baaz exclusive investigation from December 2023 had found that India, through its consulates and proxies, appeared to have interfered in the CPC leadership race to hinder the Patrick Brown campaign. Brown was seen to be close to the Sikh and Muslim community, and had raised issues around human rights abuses targeting minorities in India. The CPC commented on that Baaz story about the allegations, almost seven months before the new NSICOP report. 

“Worth noting that Pierre Poilievre's party on Tuesday opted to ask zero questions in Question Period about the Monday's national security NSICOP report that said some Parliamentarians are collaborating with foreign powers,” Globe and Mail journalist Steven Chase tweeted. 

Public Safety Minister Dominic LeBlanc also declined to answer when asked by Ottawa journalists whether he was comfortable sharing a caucus room with MPs that are allegedly colluding with hostile foreign states. 

“We urge the RCMP and other security agencies to investigate these allegations thoroughly and for the government to provide full disclosure to the public,” the WSO stressed in its statement, “we need transparency and rigorous enforcement of our laws to protect our democratic institutions.”

The report also makes a distinction between lawful and overt foreign influence efforts in Canada and hostile foreign interference done covertly.

Specifically the report found that “In reflecting on the significant body of intelligence pointing to the PRC and India’s targeting of democratic processes and institutions, the Committee observed that in almost all cases, the activities could not be construed as regular diplomatic lobbying. Rather, they clearly met the definition of foreign interference as described in Section 2 of the CSIS Act: contrary to Canada’s national interest, and deceptive, clandestine or threatening. More worryingly from the Committee’s perspective, these states could engage in such activities owing at least in part to challenges and gaps which the Committee had previously identified to the government in 2019. These challenges help to perpetuate a permissive environment for foreign actors to operate.”

Baaz has, below, reproduced sections from the report, verbatim, that touch upon India. Please note that the *** are a placeholder inserted by NSICOP to redact information, and [ ] are used by NSICOP to summarize information they otherwise cannot make public due to various confidential reasons. 

Indian interference through media manipulation:

“During the period under review, India also demonstrated the intent and capability to engage in this type of foreign interference through media manipulation. [*** Three sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described an example of efforts to discredit a political party leader using materials drafted by Indian intelligence organizations. ***]”

India’s role in transnational repression:

“During the period under review, the primary perpetrators of repression against ethnocultural communities in Canada were the PRC, India, ***, Iran, *** and ***. Observed transnational repression focused on fundamental rights and freedoms (e.g., freedom of expression)”

Indian financial support to candidates:

“In the period under review, CSIS and CSE produced a body of intelligence that showed that foreign actors used deceptive or clandestine methods to cultivate relationships with Canadians who they believed would be useful in advancing their interests – particularly members of Parliament and senators – with a view to having the Canadian act in favour of the foreign actor and against Canada’s interests. In this respect, their efforts extended beyond normal diplomatic activities.”

“In some cases, parliamentarians were unaware they were the target of foreign interference. [*** Two sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described an example of India’s financial support to some candidates from two political parties, and CSIS’s assessment that the candidates were unaware of the source of the funds. ***]”

“Some elected officials, however, began wittingly assisting foreign state actors soon after their election. [*** Three sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described examples of members of Parliament who worked to influence their colleagues on India’s behalf and proactively provided confidential information to Indian officials.***]”

A former MP providing intelligence information to India:

“Member of Parliament wittingly provided information *** to a foreign state [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] The Committee notes a particularly concerning case of a then-member of Parliament maintaining a relationship with a foreign intelligence officer. According to CSIS, the member of Parliament sought to arrange a meeting in a foreign state with a senior intelligence official and also proactively provided the intelligence officer with information provided in confidence.”

The use of clandestine networks to engage in foreign interference:

“[*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] In the period under review, foreign states developed clandestine networks surrounding candidates and elected officials to gain undisclosed influence and leverage over nomination processes, elections, parliamentary business and government decision-making. Run by foreign states’ officials, these informal networks consisted of Canadian ethnocultural community leaders and prominent businesspersons, political staffers, candidates and elected officials. Foreign officials conveyed their candidate preferences to their networks, after which co-optees or proxies promoted the chosen slate to targeted groups of voters.”

“[*** This paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph described how India also takes advantage of networks and developed and built a network of contacts through whom it conducts interference activities, including journalists, members of ethnocultural communities and some members of Parliament. ***]”

The existence of an “active proxy” who has looked for ways to further India’s interests:

“For its part, India has an active proxy, who has proactively looked for ways to further India’s interests by monitoring and attempting to influence politicians, ***. [*** Two sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described the importance India ascribes to the proxy, how Indian officials developed and built a network of contacts through whom India conducts interference activities, including journalists, members of ethnocultural communities and some members of Parliament. ***] (***)”

“Political staffers in particular are a sought-after proxy for foreign actors. Staffers can influence or exert some measure of control over a politician by influencing messaging and controlling the calendar of the elected official for whom they work to covertly support the interests of the foreign state. They have also been used to monitor their employers and report back to foreign state actors. [*** One sentence was deleted to remove injurious or privileged Information. The sentence described an example of a political staffer passing confidential information to a contact of a foreign state about a politician’s activities and donors. ***]”

Indian proxy having repeatedly transferred funds from India to politicians at all levels in return for political favours, including raising issues in Parliament at the proxy’s request:

 “[*** This paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph described CSIS information that an Indian proxy claims to have repeatedly transferred funds from India to politicians at all levels of government in return for political favours, including raising issues in Parliament at the proxy’s request. CSIS did not share this information with the RCMP or with the Commissioner of Canada Elections. ***]”

“Case Study #3: India *** funneled funds to some federal candidates ***  [*** Four paragraphs were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. This case study described an example of India likely reimbursing a proxy who had provided funds to candidates of two federal parties. It noted CSIS’s assessment that none of the candidates were aware the funds were from India, and that meetings between newly elected members of Parliament who had received funding and Indian officials were to take place. ***]”

Indian interference in the Conservative Party of Canada leadership race:

 “[*** This paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph described India’s alleged interference in a Conservative Party of Canada leadership race. ***]”

Jaskaran Sandhu hails from Brampton, Canada, and is the co-founder of Baaz. He is a Strategist at the public affairs and relations agency State Strategy. Jaskaran also previously served as Executive Director for the World Sikh Organization of Canada and as a Senior Advisor to Brampton’s Office of the Mayor. You can find Jaskaran on Twitter at @JaskaranSandhu_

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